VOLUME V
SPRING 1997

FIRM SIZE AND THE REMUNERATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
 
PEDRO ORTÍN
Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona
 
This paper presents empirical evidence from a sample of Spanish firms, on the relationship between their size and the compensation of their general ma-nagers. The evidence is interpreted under the predictions of Rosen's (1982) model on the allocation of managers along hierarchical positions. The evi-dence is consistent with the tested predictions of the model and allows for comparisons with the results obtained with Anglosaxon firms. The elasticity of compensation to size is smaller in the Spanish sample than the elasticity estimated for U.S. and U.K. firms. Differences in the ownership structure between Spanish and Anglosaxon firms may explain these differences in the elasticities.
 
Keywords: compensation, top executives.

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