In this paper we calibrate the distortions associated to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the European Union. This policy fixes the fishing shares (quotas) for the European fleets in accordance with the Relative Stability Principle. In order to do this, we build a model of fisheries regulation in which the profits of each fleet can be measured (or weighted) in a different way. Model calibration based on the available data for the Northern Stock of Hake allows us to investigate several questions. First, we obtain the implicit gauge discrimination used by the European Commission in fixing the quotas among the European fleets. The main finding is that the shares fixed by the CFP implicitly mean a lower weight of the Spanish fleet with respect to those given to the rest of the European fleets. Second, we compare the stationary exploitation associated with the legal system of quotas with that associated to the observed quotas. We find that the modification of the current quotas may increase the total profits of the fishing ground. Finally, we investigate the effects of changing the statu quo for the market quotas that guarantee the fishing ground recovering promoted by Fischler. We show that a progressive adjustment is better than a temporary closing of the fishing ground.

Key words: relative stability principle, common fishery policy, fishery regulations.
JEL Classification: Q22, Q28.